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Abstract  
The differences between ordo and neoliberalism are many and varied. They 
include significant temporal and spatial differences, ascending in distinct places 
and periods of state transformation and capitalist development.  They also include 
institutional and ideational differences: ordoliberalism is associated with rigid 
anti-majoritarian and pro-competitive rule-based institutions, in a primarily 
domestic context, neoliberalism with a looser set of political interventions 
directing class and geopolitical conflicts, domestically and imperially. This paper 
suggests, however, that within the constitutional dynamic of European integration 
and postwar reconstruction, ordo- and neo-liberalism represent a single 
movement: a conflation of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism in 
opposition to democracy and especially in opposition to democratic constituent 
power.  
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Introduction 
 
The differences between ordo- and neo-liberalism are many and varied. They 
include significant temporal and spatial differences, ascending in distinct periods 
of state transformation and capitalist development.  They also include 
institutional and ideational differences: ordoliberalism is associated with rigid 
anti-majoritarian and pro-competitive rule-based institutions, in a primarily 
domestic context, neoliberalism with a looser, discretionary set of political 
interventions directing class and geopolitical struggles, domestically and 
imperially. I would like to suggest, however, that within the constitutional 
dynamic of European integration and postwar reconstruction, ordo- and neo-
liberalism represent a single movement: a conflation of political authoritarianism 
and economic liberalism in opposition to democracy and especially in opposition 
to democratic constituent power.  
 
The dynamic of authoritarian liberalism is evident throughout the recent Euro-
crisis, with politically authoritarian forms of governing emerging at national and 
supranational level in defense of programmes of economic liberalism, especially 
within the Eurozone (Wilkinson, 2013). Similar phenomena have been labelled 
‘authoritarian neo-liberalism’, grouping together recent critical conjunctures in 
Latin America and Southeast Asia, often under the auspices of the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ in international affairs (Bruff, 2014). In each of these 
contexts, principles associated with democracy and social rights are subsumed by 
a mode of governing that operates in accordance with capital accumulation, 
marketization and economic rationality.  
 
The constitutional background to the Euro-crisis response is a mix of ordoliberal 
principles entrenched at the Treaty of Maastricht (price stability, fiscal discipline, 
avoidance of moral hazard), neoliberal political economic strategy pushed 
through conditionality programmes (austerity, privatization, deregulation) and ideological commitment to the European project (‘if the Euro fails, Europe fails’).  
As a matter of legal and political form, ordoliberalism and neoliberalism are often in tension with each other, as ordoliberalism’s rule-based commitments come up 
against neoliberal discretionary politics. But they are not in basic opposition, at 
least from the perspective of a constitutional theory that takes democracy 
seriously. On the contrary, a common denominator is the elision or repression of 
any democratic alternative to economic liberalism in general and austerity in 
particular. This is maintained in practice by a third factor: the material and 
ideological pressure to remain within the Euro-regime itself and the lack of any 
alternative political vision.  
 
The Maastricht settlement is now coming to a head as the pressure placed on 
elected domestic governments (often self-imposed or imposed by other branches 
of the state or regional state-system) to remain within the single currency is 
increasingly matched by counter-pressure to leave in order to regain monetary 
authority. Italy is the latest Member State in which this stress is provoking 
constitutional crisis, with no apparent way out. And the basic dynamic affects 
creditor as well as debtor states, with anti-systemic parties and movements on the 
rise in Germany and France. The underlying tension, however, is not, as some 
argue, merely a temporary one linked to a period of economic emergency; on the 
contrary, it is hard-wired into the postwar constitutional settlement in Europe. 
The aim of the Euro-crisis measures is not to enable a future return to normal 
democratic politics, but to restore the pressure of the financial markets and the 
constraints imposed by them, reinstating by different means the same constraints 
(conditionality) now imposed through political coercion and institutional devices 
such as the European Stability Mechanism and the Outright Monetary 
Transactions of the ECB. The last decade of crisis response can be viewed as 
having effected, in practice, a conservative revolution: bypassing and 
circumventing normal parliamentary, democratic and legal accountability in 
order to conserve a liberal economic regime. 
 
The deep constitution of this conjuncture can be explored by considering the 
longer pedigree of the confluence of political authoritarianism and economic 
liberalism (Wilkinson, 2017). German Social Democrat and constitutional theorist Hermann Heller coined the term ‘authoritarian liberalism’ in the interwar period 
(Heller, 2015), targeting with the label not only the centrist and conservative 
Cabinets of Chancellor Brüning that governed Germany before the Nazi party took 
power, but also the constitutional theorist who had advised them, Carl Schmitt 
(Bonefeld, 2017). Schmitt had recommended a strong state in order to defend the 
free market economy against the threat of democratic socialism and associated 
experiments of economic democracy, encapsulated in his address to the 
Langnamverein in 1932, ‘strong state, free economy’ (Cristi, 1998). This motto 
would be taken up and reformulated by the ordoliberals, who stressed not only 
the dangers of unfettered democracy but of unfettered capitalism and its tendency 
to self-destruct by leading to monopolies and cartels. The state needed to be 
strong to secure the legal and institutional conditions (the ordo) of the free market 
and disarm both democratic and capitalist threats to it.  
  
The polemic between Heller and Schmitt took place in the crucible of late Weimar, 
as it was teetering on the brink of collapse. But with a longer historical arc in view, 
the combination of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism comes to 
appear less exceptional than normal. As Karl Polanyi argued, the pattern of 
authoritarian liberal response and reaction to economic crisis was far from unique 
to Weimar – right across the globe, states tried to maintain the political-economic 
demands of the Gold Standard, fiercely resisting social democratic movements 
through exceptional measures, until, eventually but unevenly, they abandoned 
Gold, and market liberalism, leading, for example, to Welfarism in Britain and the 
New Deal in the US (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]). According to Polanyi, the more fiercely 
countries resisted social democracy through authoritarian government in the 
name of economic liberalism and sound finances, the stronger and fiercer the eventual backlash (the ‘double movement’). Authoritarian government hollowed 
out democracy, ultimately weakening its ability to respond to the Fascist threat 
when it arrived. It was, in other words, authoritarian liberalism that directly 
prepared the ground for Fascism.1  
 Polanyi’s account opens up a broader point about the backdrop to the interwar 
conjuncture. The authoritarian state on which the defence of the interests and 
ideas of economic liberalism depended made its mark not only in the crisis 
response of the 1920’s and 30’s but in the initial forging of the market society 
across the nineteenth century. The market society was not spontaneous but 
planned and often coercively implemented using a strong, authoritarian state 
apparatus.  
 
Taking a similar tack, the argument here is that authoritarian liberalism signifies 
not only the exception, the crisis response, but also the norm, the postwar 
European constitutional state and regional order. This is reconstituted from the 
beginning in an authoritarian vein in order to restore and maintain economic 
liberalism after its interwar collapse. The project of European integration plays a 
significant role in this restoration, beginning with the supranational institutions 
of the Paris and Rome Treaties. But it is a domestic as much as a regional 
reconfiguration.  
 
This new brand of authoritarianism reflects the reaction of political elites (as well 
as large sections of the people themselves) to the fear of a democratic- and class-
consciousness that was unleashed in the interwar period and that remained a 
threat to the stability of a liberal order. Although this postwar settlement has been captured by the label of ‘restrained democracy’, or even the inappositely named 
‘militant democracy’, these labels conceal a de-democratisation of the political 
process, with matters taken out of the hands of ordinary democratic politics in 
order to promote political and economic stability (Müller, 2011). Indeed, the West 
German case represents a de-politicisation (qua de-democratisation) not only of 
ordinary politics but also of constitutional politics with its entrenched Basic Law 
and conservative constitutional culture, closely guarded by a Constitutional Court. 
It is from this perspective that we can see the neoliberal state of the 1970’s and 
the recent austerity state of the financial crisis to represent a deepening rather 
than a departure from the authoritarian liberal trajectory of postwar state 
transformation.2  
 
The purpose of this contribution is thus to suggest that despite important 
differences between ordoliberalism and neoliberalism, regarding, for example, 
their temporal arcs, ideological-institutional supports and geopolitical 
orientations, there is a constitutionally significant common denominator. In short, 
what may appear a conjunctural turn to political authoritarianism in the 
exceptional moment of economic emergency is rather a reflection of a deeper 
systemic feature of the prevailing postwar liberal order in Europe. This order is now in crisis, struggling to maintain the ‘extreme centrism’ it depends on for 
political support.  
 
As yet, there has been no rupture from this postwar order but there is increasingly 
an inflection, where authoritarian liberalism is mixed with aspects of 
authoritarian illiberalism, particularly with regard to issues of identity and 
immigration as right-wing nationalism returns. This is occurring within the 
European Union, most evidently in Central and Eastern Europe but also in the 
core, such as in Italy. Brexit may follow this inflection. But if it were to signify a 
rupture with the postwar order of authoritarian liberalism, it would be through a 
reclaiming of democratic sovereignty over the economy. It is, however, too early 
to tell where Brexit will lead.  
 
 
Militant Democracy, Restrained Democracy or Authoritarian Liberalism? 
 
The crisis of the constitutional state in late Weimar Germany was a feature not 
only of the political and economic turbulence associated with reparations, war 
guilt  and the Versailles Treaty. It was also a feature of domestic class struggle, 
predominantly between a class-conscious and politically emancipated working 
class and an anti-democratic and embittered ruling class. This threatened the 
political economic order guaranteed in the 1919 Constitution, which promised to 
protect economic liberalism as well as the social state, posing a dilemma well 
understood by its architect, Hugo Preuss (2000). Above all, it was the anti-
democratic stance of political and economic elites that seriously hindered the 
long-term prospects of the Weimar Republic (Kershaw, 1990). The reaction of the 
governing elites and industrialists of the early 1930’s to the political and economic 
instability, rendered more acute by the depression, was a combination of 
authoritarianism and economic liberalism. This configuration was identified by 
Heller and Polanyi as crucial to the collapse of Weimar (Heller, 2015 [1932]; 
Polanyi, 2001 [1944]). In their analysis, it was the capitalist market system and its 
material inequalities that ultimately undermined democracy and laid the path to 
the Fascist takeover.  
 
Yet the message taken by mainstream constitutional theory in response to the 
extraordinary double movement and breakdown of liberal democracy it entailed 
in Germany (and elsewhere) would be quite different from the one Heller and 
Polanyi had conveyed. It was not the threat that capitalist inequality posed to 
democracy that resonated in the liberal constitutional imagination, but the threat 
that democracy posed to liberalism. The underlying concern was that democracy 
in general and the democratic constituent power in particular would erode or 
overturn liberalism and the constitutional order that undergirded it. This concern 
came to prominence through the work of another constitutional theorist of the 
period, who had emigrated to the US, but became closely involved in post-war 
German reconstruction, Karl Loewenstein. Loewenstein, writing in 1935, thought that liberal democracy needed to be more ‘militant’ in the fight against Fascism 
(and, if to a lesser extent, also against Communism) (Loewenstein 1935, 1937). 
The structures of the Weimar republic should have been more flexible in order for 
it to defend itself, by suspending constitutional rights, banning political parties, 
and preventing the rise of extremist groups and associations. Lowenstein, 
describing the opportunism of the Fascist opponents of the constitution, urged 
liberal democracy to pre-empt them, to take the fight to its enemies, to ‘fight fire with fire’ (Loewenstein, 1937: 432). This echoed Carl Schmitt’s own earlier call for 
robust defence of the Weimar constitution, by dictat and decree if necessary.  
 
In the aftermath of World War II, mainstream political and constitutional theory 
thus became preoccupied with liberal constitutional defence, Loewenstein’s 
warning apparently heeded. This narrow attention to constitutional form, 
however, elided the sociological examination of the power structures and social 
inequalities that undermined democracy in a capitalist state and state-system. The 
West German practice of entrenching strong constitutional guarantees to protect 
individual rights became increasingly influential and widespread (however 
misleading the conventional narrative of the dignified reaction to Nazism 
(Hailbronner, 2015). Constitutional lawyers, and those tasked with designing 
legal and political institutions, were dedicated to the justification of various 
institutional arrangements – whether domestic, international or supranational – 
that would constrain majoritarianism, with the rationale (or pretext) of 
preventing democratic backsliding or avoiding democratic irrationality. 
Independent technocratic institutions such as constitutional courts, expert 
commissions, and central banks, became the norm, and were gradually engrained 
in the liberal constitutional imagination. European integration was an intrinsic 
part of this post-war settlement, representing the construction of a ‘militant democracy writ large’, a project generated by administrative and bureaucratic 
processes rather than democratic energies. The role of the European Court of 
Justice in conjunction with domestic courts in pushing forward integration-
through-law would be central to the success of the project (Wilkinson, 2017). 
 
Jan-Werner Müller, with the label of ‘restrained democracy’, offers a more 
accurate assessment of this set of phenomena than suggested by the inappositely named ‘militant democracy’ (Müller, 2011). Müller shows how it was liberalism 
and political moderation that was to be militantly advanced and protected, albeit 
in the name of democratic consolidation. The dominance of Christian Democratic 
parties and a widespread ethos of social Catholicism played a strong part in this 
resettlement.  But to Müller’s account must to be added a view of this 
constitutional architecture from the perspective of its political economy; militancy 
was driven by concerns to keep the wheels of economic liberalism revolving as 
much as it was to defend political liberalism, still less to promote strong 
democracy. Authoritarian liberalism is therefore a more appropriate label given 
both the means (various forms of de-democratisation) and the ends (economic 
liberalism and market building). 
 
In constitutional enquiry, the focus was on the dangers of strong (unfettered) 
democracy, rather than, as Heller and Polanyi had warned, of unfettered 
capitalism and its tendency towards socio-economic inequality. The fragility of the 
Weimar constitution in the absence of constitutional review and even legal positivism’s relativising of the question of legitimacy are blamed by constitutional theorists and legal philosophers for Weimar’s collapse (Fuller, 1985; cf. Neumann, 
1942). Capitalism passes under the constitutional radar. If, in practice, the 
excesses of capitalism were tempered in the post-war trentes glorieuses through 
the building of the welfare state and various forms of corporatism and social 
democracy, this did not capture the attention of constitutionalists. The seminal 
texts of liberal political and constitutional theory were preoccupied with resolving 
the ‘counter-majoritarian dilemma’ through various devices of justification for 
constraints on the democratic will, both institutionally (through strong 
constitutional review) and ideologically (as in the later Rawlsian idea of ‘reasonableness’ or Habermasian ‘rational consensus’) (Rawls, 1993; Habermas, 
1995). Democracy, rather than presented as an emancipatory opportunity, or a 
material struggle for political equality, is disarmed as ‘liberal democracy’, or dismissed as likely to entail a ‘tyranny of the majority’. Popular sovereignty as 
democratic constituent power – the originary power of the people to constitute 
anew - disappears, subsumed into written constitutional law, unamendable 
provisions, juristic institutions and the protection of constitutional rights.   
 
Mainstream constitutional theory thus leads away from any critical engagement 
with political economy or of any problematisation of democratic capitalism as a 
constitutional question. European integration itself is initially given relatively 
little attention by constitutional scholars, neglected as a further stage of 
democratic capitalist development and state transformation. The creation of an 
internal market is seen tamely and benignly as designed only to ensure peace and 
prosperity after half of century of war and destruction. It is possible that post-war 
growth masked the political authoritarianism of the period. But it is apparent that 
however glorious the trentes gloriueses as a period of relative equalisation of 
material conditions, this was not a victory of democratic socialism but of a 
managed compromise of class interests, and not insignificantly, explained by the 
destruction effected by the Second World War (Piketty, 2013). 
 
There was, however, a school of thought which did take – and had since the 1930’s 
taken - seriously political economy as a constitutional question, placing economic 
freedom at the centre of its constitutional analysis. This was the school of 
ordoliberalism, as we will now explore in more detail. It is through understanding 
the ordoliberal constitutional imagnation that we can begin to unravel the 
authoritarian character of the postwar settlement.  
 
 
Ordoliberalism as Authoritarian Liberalism 
 
The post-war constitutional imagination in Europe was not characterised by any 
vision of a vibrant democratic state. It was encapsulated in the story of West 
German post-war constitutional development: ‘we are (afraid of) the people’ 
(Möllers, 2008). Reaction to this fear entailed a new vision not only of the 
governing function (in particular the technocratic functioning of government) but 
also of the governing relationship, the relation between state and society, and 
specifically of the restricted nature of the right to rule over the economy. In other 
words, this is a vision of de-democratisation both of the constituent and of the 
constituted powers, of sovereignty and of government. It lays out a new vision of 
political society, of the individual as a market participant rather than a political 
actor, a consumer rather than a citizen. It is, properly understood, authoritarian 
in character; but it is an authoritarianism based on a fear of freedom that has a 
class character as well as a socio-psychological dimension: it is not only that elites 
fear and distrust the people, but also that the people fear and distrust themselves 
(Fromm, 2001 [1941]). 
  
As a constitutional vision, this was presaged in the work of the ordoliberals, whose founding meeting in Freiberg coincided with Schmitt’s address to the 
Langnamsverein, ‘strong state, sound economy’. Sharing Schmitt’s vehement anti-
communism, obsession with order, distrust of economic democracy, and belief in 
a strong state, they nevertheless presented unfettered capitalism, and not only 
democracy, as a challenge to the competition-based market society. Carl Joachim 
Friedrich identifies the ideological and constitutional significance of this ‘new liberalism’ as early as 1955, noting how it signals a fundamental re-ordering of the 
basic ideas underpinning constitutional theory (Friedrich, 1955). As Friedrich 
understood, and as Foucault would later explore in his lectures on neo-liberal 
governmentality in 1979, the decisive theoretical turn triggered by German 
ordoliberalism had been to replace constituent power (or popular sovereignty) 
with individual economic freedom — a freedom to participate in the market — as 
the legitimating device for the whole constitutional order (Foucault, 2008). This 
is not only a question of delegating power to technocratic agencies to avoid 
temporary democratic impulses; it is a basic elision or denial of political freedom 
and political agency.  
 
The new economic constitutionalism of the ordoliberals reversed the original 
meaning of the economic constitution, which for Franz Neumann had meant 
democratic control of the economy (Neumann, 1987; Scheuermann, 1996). 
Instead, the constitution itself becomes sovereign, protecting the economy from 
democracy, through technocratic and legal means. For the ordoliberals, the new 
economic constitutionalism was required in order to achieve the complete 
abolition of class as well as national conflicts from the political domain (Bonn, 
1982). It would be based on formal equality, individual economic rights and a 
competitive market economy. The class-conscious struggles of the inter-war 
period would be repressed in order to secure political and economic stability, 
threatened by the democratic forces that the inter-war period had unleashed. The 
new political theology of the post-war order would be fiscal prudence and 
economic efficiency, the model of the German ‘economic miracle’. Democracy 
would be curtailed not (only) for fear of its violating civil or political rights but out 
of concern for its impact on the economy. The strong state and its constitutional 
and legal apparatus would protect the market economy, and disarm any 
democratic or capitalist threats to it. 
 
Although it was far from straightforwardly applied (in practice softened by the 
Social Market economy and aspects of corporatism), this reconfiguration of the 
constitutional imagination would become ideologically ascendant, first in 
Germany and then elsewhere, not least through its influence on the process of 
European constitutionalisation (Slobodian, 2018; Cf Wigger, 2017). The self-
understanding of constitutionalism in Europe would be increasingly conditioned 
by ideologies and interests that correspond to economic rationality and the logic 
of market competition, effecting a new differentiation of the political and 
economic realms by taking matters out of domestic democratic decision-making 
(Mestmäcker, 2007).  In conjunction with principles developed by the European 
Court of Justice this would import a strong economically liberal bias into the 
project of European integration (Scharpf, 2010). It is a trend that would become 
more acute in time and of course extend far beyond the EU (Jayasuriya, 2001; Gill 
and Cutler, 2014).  
 
At the Treaty of Maastricht, the differentiation between the political and the 
economic is taken to a new stage through the constitution of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). EMU is based on the separation of supranational 
monetary policy from domestic fiscal authority and on the avoidance of moral 
hazard, prohibiting monetary financing as well as debt sharing. In this configuration, a Member State’s ability to spend and repay its existing debts would 
be based on its own ability to raise resources, which —in the era of the ‘debt state’ 
(and not least due to tax arbitrage in a world and European market where capital 
moves relatively freely) — was increasingly undertaken through financial 
borrowing. The market was meant to ensure that interdependent states would 
retain sound finances, backed up institutionally by a Stability and Growth pact that 
was, however, seriously under-enforced, notably against France and Germany in 
its early phase, before the financial crisis (Menendez, 2013).  
 
The new stage of integration represented by EMU must be understood in the 
broader context of neo-liberal globalisation of the 1980s, and the turn to 
financialisation of the economy. This incorporated a loosening of capital controls, 
with the free movement of capital effectively becoming a fundamental right within 
the EU (Menendez, 2013). With its commitment to a de-politicised monetary 
policy based exclusively on price stability and an independent but limited 
European Central Bank (ECB) with restricted monetary tools and without the 
guidance of any supranational economic policy capable of dealing with uneven 
development, socio-economic heterogeneity, or exogenous fiscal shocks, the 
Maastricht Treaty attempted to supra-nationalise ordoliberal principles designed 
for domestic implementation (Tuori and Tuori, 2012).  
 
Maastricht would also signal an end to the functionalist logic that economic 
integration would prompt political integration, and that politicisation would then 
force elites to engage mass publics in European matters and precipitate a process 
of Euro-democratisation (Marks and Hooghe, 2009). On the contrary, it removed 
an important lever of power from the political pillars of the Member States, but 
without reconstructing it at the supranational political level or establishing any 
plans to do so. The new currency – a ‘currency without a state’ – would not only 
be democratically unaccountable; it would also lack the social and political bonds 
of community to sustain it, offering a symbol of the new era of ‘economic Messianism’ (Wilkinson, 2014). To adopt Wolfgang Streeck’s heuristic (Streek, 
2013), Maastricht seemed a decisive victory for capitalism over democracy, and just as commentators were proclaiming ‘the end of history’ with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Even supposedly critical theorists came to announce the 
impossibility of any alternative to capitalism and presented the European Union – 
however flawed in its detail - as an unequivocally emancipatory project, a stepping 
stone to the world society. 3 
 
The Maastricht project flows from the same premises of market-building, 
economic rationality and de-politicisation (qua de-democratisation) that 
characterised the deep reconstitution of postwar Europe. It signals an 
exaggeration of the separation of the political and the economic, now removing 
one of the key marks of sovereignty – the power of monetary authority - from the 
member states. It also, however, signals the point at which serious levels of 
popular discontent with the project would begin to emerge, ending the ‘permissive consensus’ of the foundational period. This could be seen in the rise 
of nationalist parties as well as various democratic shocks to the EU, in referenda 
from Denmark to Ireland, through to the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005, rejected by the French and Dutch electorates but then repacked as the 
Lisbon Treaty, and now with the Brexit referendum.  
 
 
Euro-Crisis 
 
When the Euro-crisis hits, the Maastricht constitution struggles to hold, and the 
crisis response becomes subject to increasing social, political and legal 
contestation, from social movements in the margins, from positions of 
governmental power (as in the Greek case), and from strong domestic institutions 
such as the German Constitutional Court. Having lost faith in normal institutional 
routes, the apparatus of the state and European state-system increasingly resorts 
to cajoling and coercing, undermining even the moderate checks and balances of 
constitutional accountability in an attempt to maintain order (Wilkinson, 2015a).  
 
The ordoliberal rules of the game established at Maastricht are in tension with the 
discretionary politics of neoliberal structural adjustment, as well as with the 
functional imperative to maintain the symbol of European integration, the single currency (e.g. the euro is ‘irreversible’, ‘if the Euro fails, Europe fails’). In turn, all 
three come into conflict with the democratic and social movements against 
austerity, and in the case of Greece this was pushed (nearly) to the limit with the 
election of Syriza, an anti-austerity but pro-European government in January 
2015. The circle is squared by permitting ‘rescue programs’, not as an act of democratic solidarity, but through a ‘grey area’ of Union law, and with strict 
conditionality attached (Menendez, 2013).  
 
In this way, the narrative of moral hazard is switched from the risky behaviour of 
private creditors to the profligacy of public debtors – the greatest ‘bait and switch’ 
in history, as Mark Blyth calls it (2013). This permits a moralisation of the debt, 
and a (misleading) metaphor to take hold of the imagination, that of the frugal 
Swabian household, which saves before it spends. The ideology of ordoliberalism 
is maintained alongside the practice of neoliberall austerity. Fiscal indiscipline is 
avoided in theory, because states have to pursue the austerity programmes (the ‘strict conditionality’) that, it is claimed, would be demanded were they still 
subject to the discipline of the financial markets. States – and the banks they are 
indebted to – are rescued enough to avoid immediate default, but without the debt 
restructuring that would be necessary to escape future dependency (Jessop, 
2017). 
 
All of this suggests that the constitutional crises are not fundamentally about a 
formal conflict between emergency politics and the normal rules of the game. In 
practice, constitutional forms have been relatively easily bent or circumvented 
when necessary and dubious measures rubber-stamped by the European Court of 
Justice. They are rather surface indicators of a deeper crisis of the material 
constitution (Goldoni and Wilkinson, 2018).  
 
Since democratic support for the EU is shallow and permissive, and increasingly 
fragile since Maastricht, the institutions and political elites that sustain it have to 
compensate in other ways, presenting those who contest the EU (and the austeriry 
regime associated with it) as irrational, unreasonable or un-European (Di Fabio, 
2014). Euro-scepticism, misleadingly, is merely dismissed as illiberal, a feature of 
the new ‘populism’, a strategy only likely to reinforce democratic disconnect with 
the EU and bury the deeper causes of its malaise. Fear becomes the method of 
European integration in a more overt manner – not only a fear of democracy but 
of any serious questioning of the logic of further integration (Weiler, 2012). If the 
power of this method was apparent in the Greek crisis, with the ultimate 
capitulation of the Syriza government to the demands of the Troika despite the ‘Oxi’ vote, its limits may have been revealed through the recent Brexit referendum, 
testing for the first time, the capacity of a state to leave (Wilkinson, 2016).  
 
To be sure, the Euro-crisis, and the response to it, suggests that the material order 
of democratic capitalism in the European state-system is nothing if not complex. 
The interests of capital are not always unified or aligned across the continent. 
They may diverge, marked by contests between capitals – London, Berlin, Paris, 
Athens, Rome and the national interests they represent (and of course 
misrepresent) – as much as between capitalism and democracy (Streeck, 20130. 
A study of authoritarian liberalism thus now needs to capture not only domestic 
de-democratisation, but the hegemonic relations between different capitals in a 
new ‘German Europe’, where every country is urged to imitate Germany’s political 
economy despite the impossibility of such a demand (Thompson, 2013).  
 
The Eurozone thus develops in a neo-colonial manner, along the lines of a core-periphery relationship between ‘creditor’ and ‘debtor’ nations. Germany becomes the ‘reluctant hegemon’, and the Greek people are ‘punished’ for electing a left-
wing government that dared to oppose the austerity agenda of the Troika and 
Euro-group (Habermas, 2015), only to capitulate eventually to the ‘TINA’ narrative (‘There Is No Alternative’ to neo-liberal structural reform). The 
domestic clash between capitalism and democracy is displaced by an imperial 
regime of integration; democracy pays the price.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Considered in the longue durée of the battle between economic liberalism and 
social democracy, Maastricht has been described as having put a decisive end to 
the European civil war between Right and Left that took place across the ‘short twentieth century’. It signalled the triumph of economic liberalism over socialism. 
The victory of capitalism itself was even declared complete. As Etienne Balibar 
frames it, reflecting on the (re-) birth of the EU at the Treaty of Maastricht, what 
is extraordinary is the explicit and detailed setting of its liberal political-economic 
goals into rigid constitutional guarantees: 
 ‘The EU in its constitutive moment (Maastricht) was endowed with a quasi-constitution… where, for the first time in this part of the world… a principle of 
political economy deriving from a specific ideological discourse (namely neo-liberal deregulation and unrestricted competition, believed to produce ‘optimal allocation of resources’ and spontaneously ‘just’ redistribution) was presented as 
the sovereign rule which all member states ought to implement in their national 
policies under close surveillance of the federal (or quasi-federal) organs of the Union…’ (Balibar, 2014) 
 
If the argument here is accepted, however, this battle, or at least its preliminary 
stages, may have already long been lost. The democratic implications of ordo- and 
neo-liberal political economy are underscored by the reconstitution of Europe 
right from the start of the post-war period. Once politics is reduced to a single 
political-economic logic, and the possibility of genuine renewal comes down to the 
possibility of exercising the constituent power, the autonomy of the political is 
reduced to a bare formality or the prospect of a revolutionary rupture. This 
resettlement occurs at the beginning of the post-war period, both through 
reconstitution of the European state and in significant part through the project of 
European integration. The differentiation of the political and the economic is 
cemented at Maastricht, continued into a further stage, with neoliberal 
financialisation representing a deepening rather than overturning of the post-war 
logic of integration.  
 
To be sure, the post-war liberal constitutional imagination in Europe, though far 
from democratic, is more passively than actively authoritarian. It is technocratic, 
institutional, and juridical in terms of its constitutional form. In substance it is 
economically liberal, dedicated to expanding market integration, pursuing free 
trade and intensifying economic rationality. Politically, it is moderate, extreme 
only in the centrism it espouses and the technocratic and managerial ethos it 
embodies. Democracy is increasingly restrained if not yet extinguished.  
 
This gradual hollowing out of democracy – central to both ordo and neoliberalism 
if pursued by different means – presages the more active authoritarianism to 
come. Although democracy had always been subdued in the post-war construct, 
since Maastricht, and especially since the Euro-crisis, it would be systematically 
over-ridden, and not only in response to parliaments but to popular referenda. 4  The ‘Oxi’ referendum in 2015 was the most explosive but far from unique 
expression of popular discontent that would be subsequently ignored or 
overturned. The full democratic cost has yet to be calculated.  
 
If the ultimate capitulation of Greece suggests authoritarian liberalism in Europe 
may survive, developments elsewhere, as right-wing Eurosceptic parties surge in 
popularity (in Hungary, Poland, as well as in the core of Europe, in France, 
Germany and Italy) suggests that the authoritarian liberal suppression of the 
democratic voice may, as in the interwar period, tend not only to the victory of 
capitalism, but also to the resurgence of reactionary forms of authoritarian 
illiberalism. 5  Whether any reprisal of the inter-war breakdown of liberal 
democracy will more closely resemble tragedy or farce remains to be seen 
(Wilkinson, 2015b). 
 
The current conjuncture has thrown the postwar settlement into doubt, if not yet 
into oblivion. It has been strongly contested, but there has been no definitive 
rupture, with the possible exception of Brexit. The UK is one of the few places in Europe to have avoided the ‘Pasokification’ (virtual annihilation) of the traditional 
centre left party, the UK Labour party under Jeremy Corbyn performing 
extraordinarily well in comparison to its sister parties on the Continent, with 
roughly 40% of the electorate, and becoming the biggest mass political party in 
Europe. There are of course particular features of the UK’s constitutional 
landscape that explain this other than Brexit. But is it possible that the UK’s 
departure from the status quo of EU membership, ironically given its advanced 
neoliberal trajectory, might lead not to a right-wing authoritarian illiberalism, as 
is occurring within the European Union, but towards a form of democratic 
socialism, as may only be feasible outside it? 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
 
1 According to to Polanyi, it was reaction to the ‘deadlock of the market system’ that precipitated the ‘conjoint disintegration’ of the political and economic system 
across the globe. Where liberals obstructed social and economic reforms that 
might involve planning, regulation or control, ‘the victory of fascism was made 
 
 practically unavoidable’. Rejecting purely local or historical explanations for the situation that gave birth to Fascism, ‘in reality’, Polanyi insists, the part it played 
was determined by one factor: ‘the condition of the market system’ (Polanyi, 2001 
[1944]): 250–265).  
2  The point is not to say that there is nothing new about neoliberalism, for 
example, as a regime of accumulation based on increasing financialisation of the 
economy and changing domestic and geo-political constellations of power. The 
point is rather that its newness does not consist in its authoritarian tendencies. On 
the significant features of neoliberalism, see e.g. Fine and Saad-Filho (2017). 
3  Most notably Jürgen Habermas, declaring that since 1989, "it has become 
impossible to break out of the universe of capitalism; the only remaining option is to 
civilise and tame the capitalist dynamic from within” (Habermas, 2012: 106). This 
is the same Habermas who now declares Brexit the defeat of capitalism by 
populism, Die Zeit, 12 July 2016; http://www.zeit.de/kultur/2016-07/juergen-
habermas-brexit-eu-crises-english, ( accessed 14 July, 2018). 
4 The most conspicuous warning sign was surely the Dutch and French rejection 
of the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005, which was followed by its repackaging in 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
5 The turn to ‘authoritarian populism’ in Eastern Europe has been described as an 
inflection of, rather than rupture from, neoliberalism (Dale and Fabry, 2018).  
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